Lloyd George believed in leadership. His heroes in history were strong leaders like Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon, Theodore Roosevelt – and, alas! Hitler. When he first cast eyes on the House of Commons in November 1880, his mind led him, approvingly, to the leadership style of William the Conqueror. ‘I will not say but that I eyed the assembly in a spirit similar to that in which William the Conqueror eyed England on his visit to Edward the Confessor, the region of his future domain.’

Kenneth O. Morgan analyses the impact on Lloyd George of two powerful leaders: William Gladstone and Abraham Lincoln.

Lloyd George’s own moment of conquest came when he emerged as the nation’s leader at the height of wartime in 1916. Thereafter his highly personal style and method of leadership led to his own downfall nearly six years later: hence Baldwin’s disapproving judgement on Lloyd George as ‘a dynamic force’. Hence also Lloyd George’s inability to work in government with another great egotist, Winston Churchill, in 1940. But Lloyd George, the self-styled ‘cottage-bred man’, saw himself as a special kind of leader, a democratic leader, an instrument of populism. Two powerful influences on his vision of leadership were William Ewart Gladstone and Abraham Lincoln. The bicentenary of both in 2009 may afford an opportunity to examine what kind of influences they actually were.

As far as Gladstone is concerned, he and Lloyd George could not have been more different. Gladstone came from a wealthy mercantile family who had profited from sugar and tobacco plantations (and slave labour) in Demerara and Jamaica; he was a product of Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. Lloyd George, whose father died when he was one year old, grew up in
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a shoemaker’s home in the small Caernarfonshire village of Llanystumdwy. He went to the small local National school, but his education came primarily from the university of life. In contrast to Gladstone’s devout high Anglicanism, Lloyd George was an aggressive radical nonconformist, a Campbellite Baptist located on the further reaches of dissent. His youthful hero was the Unitarian, Joseph Chamberlain, along with Michael Davitt, the Irish nationalist and quasi-socialist land nationaliser. Even so, Gladstone had to come to terms with the young Lloyd George, a Campbellite Baptist who was a fervent advocate.

Gladstone was present in the House in June 1890 when Lloyd George gave his maiden speech, a lively affair dealing with the taxation of landlords’ licences, a favourite theme of Lloyd George and his colleagues. Lloyd George excitedly told his wife how the old man was ‘delighted’ with his performance. For his part Lloyd George told Lord Riddell years later how impressed he was by Gladstone as a parliamentary speaker and presence: ‘Head and shoulders above anybody else I have ever seen in the House of Commons’, in gesture, language, fire and, latterly, wit. He had tremendous power, though at times he tended to go on too long. Like others, he was in awe of the riveting effect of Gladstone’s eye. His fellow Welsh backbencher, Sam Evans, once told him that he wished Gladstone ‘would take that terrible eye off us’.

But the young Lloyd George and the Grand Old Man soon came into conflict. They clashed over the Clergy Discipline (Immorality) Bill, a measure in which Lloyd George had no direct interest at all, but which allowed him to raise the topic of the establishment of the Church of England. Gladstone was profoundly irritated by the Welsh backbencher’s impertinent remarks, including an observation that drunken parsons were more agreeable than sober ones. Stuart Rendel was infuriated by ‘the madness of the people of France, whom he considered more intelligent than the English, and looked forward to stronger contacts with them after the construction of a Channel Tunnel (of which Sir Edward Watkin was a fervent advocate).

Gladstone was not impressed with Gladstone’s last government of 1892–94. He thought it far too conservative and unable to do enough for ordinary working people or for the national needs of Wales. He told his brother, William George, minding the shop for the family solicitor’s firm back in Portmadoc, that there were too many ‘mangy old hacks’ around Gladstone. It was a ‘combination of ineptitudes’. One junior minister, Kay-Shuttleworth, was ‘fodder for the undertaker’. Lloyd George had very mixed feelings when his Welsh colleague, Tom Ellis, agreed to become junior whip (later Chief Whip) when Rosebery succeeded Gladstone in 1894, and there was evidence of tension between the two Welshmen on whether Ellis’s alleged ‘grasping the Saxon gold’ was or was not a betrayal of the needs of Wales.

Glads tone was irritated in return. First, he was, as a Churchman, far more hesitant about disestablishment in Wales, as opposed to Ireland where he had disestablished the Church in 1869, and only came to accept it for Wales, with some reluctance, in 1893. The four Welsh dioceses, after all, were an organic part of the province of England.
Canterbury. Secondly, Gladstone was anxious to show, as he put it in 1892 when arguing against having a Royal Commission on Welsh Land, that ‘it was not the Irish case all over again’, in political or agrarian terms, and that home rule for Wales was not a practical or desirable objective.

Lloyd George, for all his populism, was somewhat relieved when Rosebery and not Sir William Harcourt succeeded Gladstone as Prime Minister in March 1894, since Rosebery appeared to be more sympathetic to the nonconformist viewpoint. He then led a brief four-man revolt against a tottering government on the issue of the primacy to be accorded Welsh disestablishment, which had stood second in the Liberals’ Newcastle Programme in 1891. His backbench manoeuvres, which led to the Liberals’ majority falling in committee to only seven, perhaps helped towards the ignominious fall of the government on the trivial ‘cordite vote’ in June 1891. The Home Secretary at the time, Herbert Asquith, was not enamoured of the Welsh freebooter’s views on party and personal loyalty then or later. He told Tom Ellis that ‘you showed rather too great a tendency to whitewash him [Lloyd George], after the underrun and disloyal way in which[ ] he undoubtedly acted’. H. H. Fowler, one of Asquith’s former Cabinet colleagues, shared this view. In fact, the quasi-nationalism of Cymru Fydd in Wales at this time was not compatible with the approach of the Liberal government, or any mainstream British political party. Until Cymru Fydd collapsed in January 1896, riven by internal divisions, it was the most erratic phase of Lloyd George’s career.

Thereafter Lloyd George’s Liberalism followed a very different path from that of Gladstone, especially after the Welshman became a government minister after December 1905. First, the New Liberalism of social reform, with which Lloyd George was strongly identified at the Treasury from April 1908 onwards, meant an expanded role for the central state and a programme of progressive, redistributive direct taxation far beyond what Gladstone would have ever countenanced. The People’s Budget of 1909, and even more that of 1914, marked a total contrast with Gladstonian finance, and launched quite new principles of public taxing and spending policies that endured down to the regime of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s.

Secondly, Lloyd George was a good deal less devout on free trade than the Grand Old Man had been. His measures while at the Board of Trade in 1905–08, especially the Patents and Merchant Shipping Bills, showed a remarkable casualness for a Liberal minister towards protectionist tendencies. Lloyd George’s peacetime coalition of 1918–22 made marked inroads into tariff reform, notably the Anti-Dumping Bill of 1921 with its protective attitude toward key industries and ‘collapsed exchanges’. He did not object to the imperial preference introduced at the Ottawa conference in 1923. On free trade, as in religion, he was a free thinker.

And, thirdly, on Church questions Lloyd George’s inclinations as a belligerent nonconformist led him inevitably in new directions. He led the onslaught on Church schools in the 1902 Education Act and organised the mass passive resistance by Welsh local authorities against it. He fiercely defended Church disendowment in 1912 and accused Unionist critics of it as themselves ‘dripping with the fat of sacrilege’. And it was under Lloyd George that the Church in Wales was finally disestablished and disendowed in 1920.

Not surprisingly, therefore, Lloyd George’s later reflections on Gladstone were generally negative. He told Frances Stevenson, ‘I admired him but I never liked him.’ He said much the same to Riddell. He claimed that Gladstone ‘hated nonconformists’, especially Welsh nonconformists. He also ‘had no real sympathy’ for the poor or for the working class. He told his close Welsh ally, Herbert Lewis, that Gladstone was ‘always a Tory at heart’ with the bogus aristocratic pretensions of the worst of the middle class. The temperamental and ideological gulf between them came out clearly in their attitudes towards the American Civil War. Gladstone from the start sympathised with the South and its plantation owners (his own inherited wealth from the slave system in Jamaica was something on which he tended to remain notably quiet). In many ways Lloyd George was a lifelong follower of the Gladstonian cause... he inherited many of his fundamental principles from his venerable leader.

In 1862 he declared that Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, ‘had made a nation’. It was a view which he later regretted and had to recant. Lloyd George, by contrast, was always a fervent devotee of Abraham Lincoln. In time he turned some of his animus towards Gladstone against his son Herbert Gladstone – ‘the finest living embodiment of the Liberal principle that talent is not hereditary’.

And yet in many ways Lloyd George was a lifelong follower of the Gladstonian cause. Of course, he split his party in 1918, as Gladstone had done over Irish home rule in 1886. But, more importantly, he inherited many of his fundamental principles from his venerable leader.

First there was a strong commitment to political reform. He took Gladstone’s views on the House of Lords, that is, focusing on the powers of the upper house rather than fussing about its composition. Lloyd George’s stance during the debates on the Parliament Act in 1910–11 was identical with that of Gladstone at the time of his resignation in 1894, when he tried in vain to get his younger colleagues in government to reduce decisively the power of the Lords to delay or wreck Irish home rule. His casuistry in awarding titles during the so-called ‘honours scandal’ in 1918–22 showed how little the quality of the composition of the upper house meant to him. He told J.C.C. Davidson that it ‘keeps politics far cleaner than any other method of raising funds’ to sell titles rather than to sell policies, as happened in the United States.” Again, Lloyd George’s government in 1918 passed a major Reform Act, the first since Gladstone’s in 1884. There was, of course, a crucially important extra ingredient with the inclusion of votes for women, which Lloyd George always supported and which Gladstone had resisted.

Lloyd George inherited a good deal – though far from all – of Gladstone’s passion for Ireland, with the important difference that Lloyd George was always swayed by Joseph Chamberlain’s concern for protection of the Protestant minority in Ulster. In 1921, he turned decisively from a shameful policy of ‘retaliation’ to pursuing Gladstonian policies again in Ireland, and entering into successful
negotiations with the leaders of Sinn Fein. The Free State Act of January 1922, which partitioned the island, amalgamated Gladstone’s and Chamberlain’s perspectives, giving Ireland a far greater meed of independence than Parnell had advocated, and it achieved an enduring settlement in Ireland, which neither of them had managed to do.

Lloyd George’s early approach towards imperial questions was at first distinctly Gladstonian, especially during the South African War, when he emerged as a formidable critic of Chamberlainism. Indeed, he had earlier condemned Gladstone’s own ventures into imperialism, notably his invasion and subsequent occupation of Egypt in 1882. Like Gladstone, Lloyd George was always wary of the Liberal Imperialist tendency, embodied by Asquith and Grey amongst others. However, it should be added that he himself became distinctly more sympathetic towards imperial objectives in later life, notably in the Middle Eastern settlement that followed the First World War. In the debates over Indian self-government in the 1910s, Lloyd George was an unhelpful presence. Winston Churchill had asked Brendan Bracken to ‘make Lloyd George take a decent line over India’, and the latter often expressed sympathy for the reactionary views of his old ally. ‘We should keep a free hand in India’, Lloyd George observed in 1934. He added, ‘so long as the natives stick to rice, we shan’t have much trouble’. If their diet changed to wheat, there would be problems.19

Finally there was much that was Gladstonian in Lloyd George’s governing principles in foreign affairs. Like Gladstone he began as a strong sympathiser with republican France. He saw the French as a great democracy and a civilised force in the world, and warmly welcomed the Entente Cordiale of 1904. This remained an abiding view despite his New Liberal endorsement of the social welfare policies of the German empire in the later Bismarckian period. France, the cradle of revolution in 1789, which had actually disestablished its own Church in 1905, embodied the Old Liberal in him always. During the war, Lloyd George and Clemenceau gave the Entente a new buoyancy despite many arguments, and certainly enjoyed a closer relationship than did Churchill and de Gaulle in the Second World War.20 So did the British Premier with Aristide Briand in the conferences of post-war.

In the 1919 Paris peace conference, Lloyd George promoted a broadly Gladstonian agenda, and shared some of Gladstone’s preferences on national issues, notably in the Balkans. Above all, Lloyd George, like Gladstone, was strongly anti-Turk and pro–Greek on the strategic issues of the eastern Mediterranean. The confrontation with the Turks at Chanak in August 1922 resulted from the British Prime Minister’s impermeate and impractical support for the vast territorial designs in Asia Minor of the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos. This led directly to the ultimate crisis of the Coalition and the backbench Tory rebellion against Austen Chamberlain on 19 October 1922 which resulted in Lloyd George’s resignation. Even Bonar Law turned against his old ally. Sir Alfred Mond, still a Lloyd George Liberal, told his leader after the election of the ‘enormous support from all our old Liberal non-conformists for the protection of Christian minorities and of women from the hands of the Turk’, but it was not enough.21 The abiding Balkan legacy of Gladstone thus led to Lloyd George’s exclusion from power for the rest of his life.

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Abraham Lincoln was assassinated when Lloyd George was only two years old. But he became an immense personal hero and lifelong inspiration. Lincoln enjoyed a generally heroic status in Wales. The Protestant Welsh had been strongly anti-slavery and overwhelmingly supported the North in the American Civil War.22 Over 90 per cent of the Welsh who had emigrated to America resided in the northern states; a Welsh radical like Samuel Roberts of Llanbrynmair, who founded a Welsh settlement in the slave state of Tennessee and appeared to sympathise with the Confederate cause, virtually destroyed his reputation in his native land for so doing.23 Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin was first published in Britain in the Welsh language (in magazines), not in English, and a Welsh radical like the journalist-bard William Rees (‘Gwilym Hiraethog’) gave its message of human equality massive publicity. There was a famous Lincoln enthusiast, the Unitarian innkeeper-bard William Williams, who held pro-Federal sessions nightly in his inn ‘The Stag’. Williams enjoyed the bardic name Carys Coch (the stag) as a result. By the time the war came to its end, portraits of Gladstone and of Lincoln hung side by side in many a humble cottage, the Grand Old Man and Honest Abe in libertarian partnership.

One passionate enthusiast for Lincoln was Lloyd George’s Uncle Lloyd, and his nephew followed him avidly. A portrait of Lincoln still is to be seen today in the tiny living room of the old shoemaker’s home, ‘Highgate’, in Llanystumdwy. To Lloyd George, Lincoln symbolised the common man come good – the great democrat though not necessarily, as will be seen, the great emancipator. Like the young Lloyd George, he was a country lawyer taking on the vested interests in his society. The Log Cabin theme was made much of by Lloyd George’s biographers, as in From Village Green to Downing Street by J. Hugh Edwards and Spencer Leigh Edwards, in 1908. Lloyd George also compared himself to Lincoln in more personal ways, as in a shared liking for women. He quoted Lincoln as regarding meeting women – ‘I like it very much but I never get any’ (which, in Lloyd George’s case, may well be doubted).24 They both, so Lloyd George believed, endured difficult marriages. He saw Lincoln as a deeply human man and, as such, far more interesting than George Washington. ‘Lincoln’, he told Riddell in 1920, was a much bigger man than Washington who was always so correct that he was uninteresting’.25

Lincoln, one may surmise, was a more appealing model for him as head of government, since Lloyd George’s own style as Prime Minister was distinctly presidential.
impressed by Lincoln’s skill in reconciling the viewpoints—and the strong egos—of such Cabinet ministers as William H. Seward, Edwin M. Stanton, Salmon B. Chase and Edward Bates, and making this ‘team of rivals’ into an effective, executive, with the President himself very much first among equals.

Lloyd George’s Cabinet colleagues in 1919–21 would have sympathised with Seward’s comment on Lincoln—‘There is but one vote cast in the Cabinet and that is cast by the President.’ By contrast, Gladstone’s methods as Prime Minister would have appeared casual and idiosyncratic, with a personal bias towards aristocratic Whigs like Granville and Spencer and too much ‘counting of noses’ in his Cabinets. Of course, Lloyd George, an obsessively political individual of fleeting cultural interests, could never have allowed his prime ministerial energies to be diverted into such arcane pursuits as Homer, Horace or the origins of Christianity.

Lincoln added another dimension to Lloyd George’s vision of leadership—that of war leader. He emphasised Lincoln’s transcendent qualities in this respect in his Lincoln’s Day message to the American people in February 1917. Whether Gladstone would have made a great leader in war he was privately less certain.6

Lloyd George made many comparisons between Lincoln’s experience of war and his own. He praised Lincoln’s firm handling of his generals during the Civil War, as in his dismissal of Meade, the victor of Gettysburg, for failing to follow up his victory and allowing Robert E. Lee’s defeated Confederate forces to escape south over the River Potomac. Lincoln had sacked General McClellan for insubordination, much as he himself had sacked Robertson, his Chief of the General Staff. He also commended Lincoln’s choice of Grant as commander in chief and compared it with his own support for, and ultimate satisfaction with, Marshal Foch in 1918.67 Always he noted his own wartime difficulties with his own military commanders, especially Haig and Robertson. It was emphasised that the strategic judgement of the civilian Lincoln was almost always superior to that of the military.

He also hailed Lincoln’s constant and uncompromising stance on behalf of victory and unconditional surrender, and cited this precedent to American journalists who questioned the curtailment of civil liberties in wartime Britain. They had both found it necessary to make serious inroads into the legal principle of habeas corpus. Lloyd George also made free, and historically doubtful, comparison between the threat of secession from the Confederate South and from Sinn Fein and republicans generally in Ireland.68 Above all, Lloyd George praised Lincoln as the great reconciler, out to bind up the nation’s wounds, at the end of the Civil War. His purpose was above all to avoid a vindictive, Carthaginian peace. Most significantly, Lloyd George did not praise the great emancipator at all, and criticised the radical Republicans like Sumner and Wade for their partisan extremism in the latter stages of the war. He never showed enthusiasm for the idea of turning a civil war fought to defend the Union into a crusade on behalf of racial equality for disinherit black Americans.

Lincoln’s name often cropped up during the peace conference in Paris in 1919. Lloyd George exchanged views with Woodrow Wilson (a conservative Southerner whose hero was Gladstone and who gave highly conciliatory interpretations of the Civil War so as not to upset southern opinion) and Clemenceau (who visited the United States in 1865 shortly after Lincoln’s death, crossed the Atlantic eight times in all, and actually married an American woman).69 Lloyd George greatly preferred Theodore Roosevelt, pioneer of the New Nationalism, to his rival Woodrow Wilson, spokesman for the New Freedom. He noted with horror Wilson’s extreme coldness on hearing of Roosevelt’s death during the Paris conference. ‘I was aghast at the acrid detestation which flowed from Wilson’s lips.’70 Lincoln, he felt, was far superior to Wilson in every way. He had the human touch and was also a far more decisive President. ‘Wilson’s philanthropy was purely intellectual, whereas Lincoln’s came straight from the heart.’71 Lloyd George elaborated further on Lincoln’s virtues at the unveiling of the Saint Gaudens statue of Lincoln in Parliament Square in 1920. Lincoln, he declared, ‘had lost his nationality in death’. He was ‘one of those giant figures who belong to mankind.’ Lloyd George had exhibited some rare nervousness beforehand about this speech, since he would be sharing the stage with such eminences as Elihu Root and James Bryce, former US Secretary of State and British Ambassador to Washington respectively, but his was the speech that endured in the public memory.72 It is fitting perhaps that Lloyd George’s own statue, the only non-Conservative British Prime Minister there, now stands tall in the Square close to that of his hero.

In 1923 Lloyd George visited the United States for the first and last time. It was arranged by Welsh-Americans of the ‘Gorsedd’ (bardic society) in Ohio state and was an immense, gruelling tour covering 6,000 miles and thirty meetings, in Canada as well as the United States. The £30,000 he earned for syndicated newspaper columns massively boosted his income.73 Lloyd George was hailed by Americans as ‘the most famous man in the world’, to which he responded with due modesty. He met celebrities from President Coolidge to Charlie Chaplin. But Lincoln and his abiding message provided the central focus. The highlight was a visit to Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln’s one-time home. Here Lloyd George laid a wreath on Lincoln’s tomb and met his son, Robert Todd Lincoln. In his speech in Springfield, his praise was remarkably effusive. Lincoln was:

… the finest product in the realm of statesmanship of Christian civilisation, and the wise counsel he gave his own people in their day of their triumph he gives today to the people of Europe in the hour of their victory over the forces that menace their liberties.74

He then took time off to visit Civil War battlefields in Virginia and meet some aged Confederate veterans there.75 He was presented with a copy of Nicolay and Hay’s biography of Lincoln in the course of his visit.

In fact, Lincoln’s career provided the basis for Lloyd George’s international message in 1923. He spelt out two supreme priorities after the Great War. They were the reconciliation of a shattered continent and faith in democracy.
and faith in democracy – ‘Reconcile the Vanquished’ and ‘Trust the Common People’, as Lloyd George put it.36 Both were drawn from the messages of Lincoln of 1865. Both were used to press the United States not to be too isolationist in its foreign policy and not to encourage a punitive peace settlement with Germany. He attacked ‘vindicative men who wanted to trample on the defeated South’ in 1865, and he warned against a similar attitude of vengeance towards the defeated Germans. There was need for ‘the Lincoln touch’ – in peace, magnanimity.

Lloyd George’s views reflected the last phase of British admiration for Lincoln. Wales and Britain followed a different course thereafter. Lincoln remained as an abiding symbol of the need for sustaining sentiment and shared values. A famous sentimental play by John Drinkwater emphasised this theme.37 Its ‘special relationship’ based on kinship and shared values. A famous sentimental play by John Drinkwater emphasised this theme.37 Its conclusions were reinforced by the popular reception of the biography of Lincoln by Lord Charnwood. But the distinctly Liberal values identified with Lincoln’s name after 1865 were receding into history. Lincoln was far less of a hero for the British left now since the Labour movement tended to see the US and all its Presidents as harbingers of capitalism. Aneurin Bevan never mentioned Lincoln in his speeches. The Liberal MP, Isaac Foot, bracketed Lincoln with his revered Cromwell as a mighty champion of liberty. His son, the socialist Michael Foot, less sympathetic to the United States, did not – his hero was the distinctly Atlanticist figure of Thomas Jefferson, apostle of the European enlightenment.38 The decline of the Liberal Party saw Lincoln move away from centre stage amongst British politicians, perhaps until the election of that other representative of Illinois, Barack Obama, in 2008. For Lloyd George and his generation, the inspiration of Lincoln and his values was an eternally dominating theme, but times were changing.

Gladstone and Lincoln are both pivotal to Lloyd George’s political principles, style and rhetoric. Gladstone embodied his belief in the values of Liberalism and nationality overseas. But Gladstone, the friend of Whigs who described himself as ‘an out and out inequitarian’ and cherished the landed aristocracy as the basis for social leadership,39 was never a natural democrat. Lincoln it was, therefore, who stood out for Lloyd George as the symbol of his faith in democracy and popular sovereignty in times of peace, and of defending them in times of war with a terrible swift sword. Lloyd George’s vision of leadership straddled them both. Both were absorbed by Lloyd George, and both were essential parts of his greatness.

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2 Speech at the Carlton Club, 19 Oct. 1922.
6 Lord Riddell’s War Diary (Nicolson and Watson, 1913), p. 13 (17 March 1915); Lord Riddell’s Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and Afters, 1918–1923 (Gollancz, 1933), p. 158 (1 January 1920).
8 Morgan, Wales in British Politics, p. 117; Stuart Rendel to A.C. Humphreys-Owen, 28 May 1924 (National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth, Glansevern MSS., 996).
10 William George, op. cit., p. 100.
12 Gladstone to Stuart Rendel, 12 Nov. 1892 (British Library, Gladstone Papers, Add. MSS. 44549, f. 190). In fact, Gladstone was persuaded to set up a Royal Commission after all, and not a mere Select Committee.
13 Asquith to Tom Ellis, 30 Nov. 1895 (NLW Aberystwyth, Ellis papers, 74).
15 Lord Riddell’s War Diary, pp. 66–67 (7 March 1915); diary of Sir Herbert Lewis, 27 Dec. 1907 (NLW, Aberystwyth, Lewis Papers).
16 Speech at Newcastle, 6 Oct. 1862.
20 idem, Consensus and Divinity: the Lloyd George Coalition 1918–1922 (Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 348–51; Sir Alfred Mond to Lloyd George, 5 Nov. 1922 (Parliamentary Archives, House of Lords, Lloyd-George of Dwyfor Papers, G/45/5/2).
22 Y Coimisi, 1865, pp. 78–86.

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Gladstone and Lincoln are both pivotal to Lloyd George’s political leadership. The influences of Gladstone and Abraham Lincoln

LLOYD GEORGE AND LEADERSHIP: THE INFLUENCES OF GLADSTONE AND ABRAHAM LINCOLN

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Although the ex-Prime Minister’s influence is difficult to assess, this study shows that Lloyd George’s support for Hitler’s disregard for existing agreements did nothing to halt the Fuhrer’s progress or reduce the likelihood of war. Lloyd George was an appeaser, not because he was compelled by Britain’s dwindling resources but through a misplaced faith in German intentions, whoever held power in Berlin. While some of Rudman’s conclusions may be challenged, her thought-provoking study identifies more motives for appeasement and is a welcome addition to the historiography.

Dr Chris Cooper was recently awarded his PhD at the University of Liverpool. His doctoral thesis analysed the political career of Douglas Hogg, 1st Viscount Hailsham (1872–1950). He has published a number of journal articles on different aspects of modern British history and he teaches history at university.

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12 Baptist Times, 24 May 1945, p.10.
15 Ffion Hague, op.cit., 104–06.
16 Ibid., p. 206.

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26 Lord Riddell’s War Diary, p. 135 (5 Nov. 1913).
31 Ibid.
33 William D. Jones, Wales in America (University of Wales Press, 1976), pp. 184–86. There is a file on this visit in the Lloyd George of Dwyfor Papers (Parliamentary Archives, House of Lords, G/165).
34 Text of speech, Lloyd George of Dwyfor Papers, G/165.
35 The Times, 31 Oct. 1923.
36 Text of speech in Lloyd George of Dwyfor Papers, G/165.
37 Drinkwater’s play ‘Abraham Lincoln’ was first performed in October 1910.
40 Machin, Politics and the Churches, 1869–1921, pp. 212; D. Cregier, Boundary from Wales: Lloyd George’s career before the First World War (Missouri, 1976), pp. 32–34.

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8 ‘Cabinet Memorandum: secret’, 31 May 1910, Asquith papers, 23.
9 The Times, 13 April 1908.
12 Lloyd George to Balfour, 11 October 1910, Balfour papers Add Mss.46992.
14 Austen Chamberlain, Politics from Inside (1916), p. 293.
15 Crew to Asquith, 22 October 1910, Asquith papers, vol. 12.
18 Ibid., pp. 196–97.